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Abstract
With the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior, and the
development of statistical procedtfres to utilize this data, firms can now target
coupons to selected households with increasing accuracy and cost effectiveness.
As a consequence, new avenues of competition have opened up in which firms
play an active role in market segmentation. In this article, we develop an
analytical framework to examine the effect of targeting on firm profits, prices,
coupon face values, and redemption rates. We also determine firms' optimal
mix of offensive and defensive couponing. Among our findings: when rival
firms can target their coupon promotions at brand switchers, the outcome will
be a prisoner's dilemma in which the net effect of targeting is simply the cost
of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers.
*We thank John Hauser, two anonymous referees, and especially Scott Neslin for helpful sug-
gestions that have improved this article.
Programs where promotions are tailored to the household are the way to go. I see the
mass media disappearing and the individual marketing becoming almost one on one.
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I Introduction
Firms are increasingly using coupons as a marketing tool to compete for price-sensitive consumers.
During the 1980's, the number of coupons distributed by consumer goods manufacturers grew at
an average annual rate in excess of 11%. Since then, the upward trend in coupon distribution has
shown little sign of abating. According to NCH (1992), an all time high 292 billion coupons, more
than 3000 coupons per household, were distributed in 1991.
One reason why firms compete for price-sensitive consumers by offering coupons instead of
simply lowering the price of their product is that coupons engender market segmentation whereas
lower regular prices do not. In essence, coupons facilitate third-degree price discrimination because
only those consumers that present a coupon at the point of sale receive a discount; all other
consumers pay the full price.
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As pointed out by Narasimhan (1984), Levedahl (1984), Sweeney
(1984), Houston and Howe (1985), and others, such discrimination can be profitable as long as
coupon users as a group have more elastic demand and/or lower reservation prices than non-coupon
users.3 In each instance, an implicit assumption in the literature is that firms distribute coupons
randomly via the mass-media, e.g. free standing inserts in newspapers, and rely on consumer
self-selection to achieve market segmentation.4
Owing to recent advances in information technologies that have led to a growing sophistication
'Frank Woodard, marketing director for Vons Cos., as quoted by Millstein (1989).
2Coupons may serve other objectives as well. For instance, they may be used to motivate retail participation in
price promotions (Gerstner and Hess, 1991a,b). For a complete list of managerial objectives served by coupons, see
the excellent survey by Blattberg and Neslin (1990).3
Narasimhan (1984) not only endogenously derives differences in consumer willingness to use coupons based on
exogenous differences in income, he also provides empirical evidence to support the claim that coupon users are indeed
more price sensitive than non-coupon users. Babakus, Tat, and Cunningham (1988) provide additional confirming
empirical evidence.
4
In addition to the use of coupons, there are several other instances in the price discrimination literature in
which firms structure their pricing to induce consumer self-selection. For example, in Salop (1977), differences in
buyer search costs are exploited by a multi-store monopolist charging a distribution of prices. Differences in buyers'
inventory holding costs motivate firms' temporary price cuts in Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985), etc.
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in coupon targeting capabilities, firms need no longer rely exclusively on consumer self-selection
to discriminate in price. With the advent of panel data on household purchase behavior, and the
development of statistical procedures to utilize this data, firms can now target coupons to selected
households with increasing accuracy and cost effectiveness.
5 As a consequence, new avenues of
competition have opened up in which firms can play a much more active role in market segmentation.
Many analysts predict that targeted promotions are the wave of the future and will gradually
replace mass-media distribution. As an example of what is already possible, some marketing firms
and retail chain stores have co-initiated card-based programs in which plastic identification/check
cashing cards (e.g. Catalina Marketing Co's Checkout Direct) are distributed to individuals for
use when buying goods. Transactions are then entered into a database each time a customer uses
the card.s Over time, the database can be accessed to provide targeted coupons based on the
customer's history of purchasing behavior.
7 In addition to point-of-purchase programs, coupons
can also be distributed via direct-mail, thereby enabling firms to target consumers not only on the




The ongoing revolution in coupon targeting capabilities obviously has important implications
for firm rivalry and competition. Our purpose in this paper is to develop an analytical framework
to address several issues. First, what is the relationship between coupon targeting programs and
random mass-media distribution? Will the former replace the latter over time, as some believe,
or are the two complementary? Second, how does the ability to target coupons to individual
"The challenge in using panel data on household purchase behavior is to develop statistical procedures capable of
generating household-level estimates of parameters given the relatively small amount of data per household. See the
recent approach taken by Rossi and Allenby (1993).
'In many cases, the data is stored and updated right on the 'smart' card. This is the case, for instance, with
Advanced Promotion Technologies' Vision Value Club. See Litwak (1991).
'Citicorp P.O.S. Information Services has been creating a customer database, primarily through their frequent
shopper programs that track customer purchases over time and issue electronic coupons. The company plans even-
tually to sell time series data on the purchases of approximately 40 million American households. See Mayer (1990).
"For example, Computerized Marketing Technologies, Inc. mails individualized UPC coded coupons to 15 million
households three times a year (Business Week 1989). Similarly, Donnelly Marketing targets 30 million households
through its Carol Wright program (Raphel 1988a).
households affect regular prices and coupon face values? Does the answer depend on whether firms
are also distributing coupons via the mass-media? Third, do rivalrous firms stand to gain or lose
from the increasing sophistication of coupon targeting? Fourth, what types of coupon targeting
strategies can be expected to emerge in a competitive environment? That is, what fraction of
coupons should be sent to rivals' customers (offensive targeting) in an effort to increase sales, and
what fraction of coupons should be sent to own customers (defensive targeting) in an effort to
preempt rivals' coupon promotions?
Our framework posits a spatial model of product differentiation and assumes that data on past
purchasing behavior has given firms knowledge regarding the approximate location of each consumer
in brand space. Thus, in our model, the ability to target coupons permits firms to discriminate in
price according to consumer heterogeneity in brand loyalty.
9 
While this opens up a new avenue of
competition among firms, it does not preclude the traditional price discrimination that arises with
consumer self-selection. Whereas targeting coupons to specific households exploits differences in
customer brand loyalty, random coupon distribution coupled with consumer self-selection exploits
differences in coupon user/non-user price sensitivity. Both types of price discrimination can coexist.
After controlling for the effects of mass-media coupon distribution, we find that coupon targeting
intensifies competition without allowing firms profitably to raise their regular prices. Thus, the
outcome of rivalrous coupon targeting is a prisoner's dilemma in which profits are lower for all
firms. This supports the contention of some that the net effect of couponing in a competitive
environment is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers (Raphel 1988b;
and Chiang 1992). Our results also provide some support for the view that coupons should be
directed at a rival's customers for the purpose of increasing brand sales (Neslin and Clarke 1987;
and Neslin 1990).10 This strategy does indeed predominate in equilibrium, if the cost of targeting
is high. On the other hand, the model predicts that as the cost of coupon targeting declines over
'Heterogeneity in brand loyalty is the sine qua non of sales promotions in Narasimhan (1988)."5 By ascribing a central role to a firm's incremental sales per redemption, these authors implicitly assume that
targeting a rival's customers is best provided the cost of such targeting is not too steep.
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time, relatively more and more defensive targeting will be implemented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II specifies the model and notation.
In section III, we derive equilibrium coupon targeting strategies assuming that firms selectively
target coupons to individual consumers. After controlling for the effects of mass-media coupon
distribution, section IV considers the impact of competitive coupon targeting on firm profits, prices
and coupon face values. Section V examines the incidence of offensive and defensive targeting and
section VI derives comparative statics concerning the effect a declining cost of coupon targeting
over time has on the incidence of coupon redemption rates, incremental sales per redemption, and
the number of coupons distributed. Section VII concludes.
II The Model and Notation
Consider a market in which two firms sell competing brands of a consumer good that is produced
at constant marginal cost c. Since heterogeneity in consumer tastes is essential to study coupon
targeting, we adopt a spatial model of product differentiation and assume, a la Hotelling (1929),
that consumer tastes differ along a single dimension in product space. For simplicity, we abstract
from product design choices by locating firms at opposite ends of the line segment [0, 1].1
We consider a two-stage game-theoretic model of pricing and coupon distribution. In the initial
stage, firms compete for customers by simultaneously and noncooperatively choosing their regular
prices (RA, RB) and coupon face values. Once pricing and promotion depth decisions have been
made, firms proceed in stage two by distributing coupons according to their targeting strategies
(RA, SIB), which specify the probability that consumers on any given interval of the line segment
[0,1] will receive a firm's targeted coupon. Firms may also randomly distribute coupons via the
mass-media in stage two. If so, these coupons are assumed to reach all consumers with probability
one. We use subgame perfection as our solution concept which means that the actions chosen in
"The location of the firms is exogenously specified solely to simplify the exposition. Our qualitative conclusions
continue to hold for any symmetric pair of firm locations on [0,1] for which a pure strategy Nash pricing equilibrium
exists (see appendix E).
each stage are required to be Nash given the choices in the preceding stages, and the choices in the
early stages are chosen knowing the effects of such actions in the stages to follow.
1
"
This two-stage game accentuates the strategic role of firms' coupon targeting decisions by
assuming they are made subsequent to decisions on regular prices and coupon face values. From a
game theoretic point of view, an implicit assumption is that this two-step decision making sequence
corresponds to the relative speed with which these choices are typically altered in practice. Hence,
firm pricing and promotion depth decisions are thought of as strategic managerial decisions that
are relatively less responsive than perturbations in coupon targeting strategies.
A similar multi-stage sequence is also employed by Rao (1991) in modeling firms' price pro-
motion decisions in a competitive environment. Although he focuses on the frequency of firms'
price promotions, whereas we focus on firms' coupon targeting decisions, his multi-stage sequence
in which regular prices and promotion discounts are chosen prior to the frequency of promotion is
analogous to our set-up. Beyond providing a convenient framework of analysis, however, there is
anecdotal evidence, offered by Rao, that some managers do make their price promotion decisions
in such a sequence. Ultimately, however, stylized models such as ours should be judged on the
usefulness of their insights and the validity of the testable implications they generate.'
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Consumers and the spatial model framework
We now turn attention to the consumer side of the model. In particular, we posit that consumers
differ in their willingness to pay for the two brands. The farther away a consumer's tastes are from
the product characteristics of a given brand, the less the consumer is willing to pay. Let V be
a common reservation price for each consumer's ideal brand and let i be the transportation cost
per unit of distance for a consumer of type i. Then a type i consumer located at X is willing to
12See Moorthy (1985) for his excellent survey on marketing applications using subgame perfection.
"'It is encouraging to note that our analysis is robust to alternative sequences of play in which regular prices
and coupon face values are chosen prior to coupon distribution strategies. Unfortunately, we are unable to check
the robustness of our results for games in which coupon distribution strategies and coupon face values are chosen
simultaneously, since no subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies exists for such games (proof available on
request). Moreover, solving for mixed strategy equilibria when the mixing can occur over a continuum of coupon
distribution strategies, coupon face values, and possibly regular prices is beyond current game-theoretic techniques.
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pay V - t'X for brand A located at zero, and V - t'(1 - X) for brand B located at one. In order
to focus on coupon targeting in a competitive environment, we assume V is sufficiently large that
within the relevant range of prices, all consumers will make a purchase.
Consumers also differ in their willingness to redeem coupons. A fraction a of consumers incur
no costs of coupon usage. Anyone in this group who receives a firm's coupon will redeem it if she
purchases from the firm. To simplify the exposition, these consumers will henceforth be known as
C-Users. Coupon usage for everyone else is prohibitively costly. These consumers will henceforth
be known as Non-Users. Following convention, we assume that C-Users as a group are weakly more
price-sensitive than Non-Users. In our spatial framework, this means that t*, the transportation
cost for C- Users, is less than or equal to in, the transportation cost for Non- Users.
The marginal consumer among Non-Users is defined as the consumer who is just indifferent
between buying from either one of the two firms given (RA, RB). Algebraically, the location of such
a consumer must satisfy RA + t"X = RB + t"(1 - X). Solving yields
RB- RA ±I"
21n
All Non-Users who are located to the left of X will buy from firm A, while all Non-Users located
to the right of X will buy from firm B. Note that in the event both firms have equal regular prices,
X = 1/2, and Non-Users simply buy whichever brand is closer to their specific tastes.
Of even more interest is the purchasing behavior of the C- Users. Define Pi as the price C-Users
must pay to purchase firm i's product if they do not have its targeted coupon. In the event firm
i does not also randomly distribute coupons via the mass-media, this price is the same as firm i's
regular price. Otherwise, PI, is interpreted as firm i's regular price minus the face value of its mass-
media coupons, which all C-Users receive. Under either interpretation, the marginal consumer in
the set of C- Users who do not receive a targeted coupon is located at
- PB - PA+te
2tc
Those in the set who are located to the left of X will buy from firm A, while those in the set who
are located to the right of X will buy from firm B. At equal prices, consumers in this group buy
whichever brand is closer to them in product space.
Some C-Users, however, will receive one or both firms' targeted coupons. As a prelude to
determining who they might be, define d; as the net value of firm i's targeted coupon. In the event
firm i does not also randomly distribute coupons, d; is interpreted as the actual face value of firm i's
targeted coupon. Otherwise, d; is interpreted as the amount by which firm i's targeted coupon face
value exceeds firm i's mass-media coupon face value. It is now possible to distinguish between four
types of C-Users based upon their expected purchasing behavior given (PA, PB, dA, dB). Consumers
with strong preferences for brand A will prefer buying from firm A even if they have B's targeted
coupon and do not have A's targeted coupon. Algebraically, the location of such a consumer
satisfies PA + t'X < PB - dB + t'(1 - X). This inequality implies all C- Users located to the left of
PB - PA - dB + fC
XA = Zt'
will buy brand A. There is no need for firm A ever to target these consumers. Intuitively, in the
event PB = PA, XA > 0 requires dB < t , which means that the discount offered by firm B falls
short of the disutility these consumers would incur if they were to purchase brand B.
Similarly, consumers with strong preferences for brand B will prefer buying from firm B even
if they have A's targeted coupon and do not have B's targeted coupon. Algebraically, the location
of such a consumer must satisfy PA - dA + t'X > PB t t'(1 - X). This inequality implies that all
C-Users located to the right of
PB - PA + dA +t
XB = 2t '
will buy brand B. There is no need for firm B ever to target these consumers. As above, the
intuition is most easily seen in the symmetric case where PA = PB. Note that in this case, XB 1
requires that dA t .
The remaining C-Users might potentially be induced to switch brands as a consequence of
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coupon targeting. Define firm A's potential brand switchers as those consumers without strong
preferences for brand A in the sense that they lie outside the interval [0, XA], but who nevertheless
will buy from firm A conditional on having firm A's targeted coupon, regardless of whether they
have a targeted coupon from firm B. Algebraically, a consumer located at X > XA is a potential
brand switcher if and only if PA - dA + *X< PB - dB +tc(1 - X). Thus, firm A's potential brand
switchers are located at XA < X < Xs, where
XPB - PA + dA - dB + t*
21C
Intuitively, C-Users located between XA and Xs are consumers whose preferences for brand A are
relatively weak. In the absence of firm A's targeted coupon, they can be induced to buy brand B
if they have B's targeted coupon. With equal prices and coupon face values, Xs is located at 1/2.
Analogously, define firm B's potential brand switchers as those consumers lying outside the
interval [XB, 1], who will buy from firm B conditional on having firm B's targeted coupon, regard-
less of whether they have a targeted coupon from firm A. Algebraically, firm B's potential brand
switchers are described by the set of locations Xs < X < XB.
The relative locations of the four C-User types are well-ordered, although the exact positions
are contingent on the regular prices and coupon face values chosen by the firms. When coupled with
the location of the marginal consumer among C-Users who do not receive a targeted coupon, i.e.
I, there are five distinct regions where C-Users exhibit different purchasing behaviors as depicted
in figure 1.
Figure 1: C-User Locations in Product Space
Figure 1 has been drawn assuming dA > dB > 0. An analogous figure can be drawn if dB >
dA > 0. If dB were to equal zero, X - XA = XB - Xs = 0, and hence regions II and IV would have
zero width. If, in addition, dA were to equal zero, Xs - X = 0, and region III would also have zero
width. If instead, dA = dB > 0, only region III would have zero width.
III Competitive Coupon Targeting
In this section, we derive the stage-two equilibrium targeting strategies for each firm after controlling
for possible mass-media distribution. In practice, the targeting information available to firms comes
from historical data on household purchasing behavior as well as from information gleaned from
market surveys." For instance, Rossi and Allenby (1993) report on a scanner panel dataset which
consists of observations on individual household purchases of tuna dating back two and a half
years. Using newly developed statistical procedures, they show how the data can be used to rank
households according to brand preference and price sensitivity. In our model, we abstract from data
estimation problems and simplify by assuming firms can perfectly distinguish between C- Users with
different purchasing behaviors.
Assuming a constant marginal cost of coupon targeting, z, neither firm will ever target coupons
to the set of Non- Users, since these consumers do not redeem coupons, and neither firm will ever
target coupons to the set of C-Users in regions I and V, since these consumers cannot be induced
to switch brands given each firm's discount. The rest of the C- Users, however, are potential brand
switchers. These are the consumers over whom rivalry in targeted coupon promotion will occur.
Consider first a representative C- User in region II. This consumer will only buy from firm B
if she receives B's targeted coupon and does not receive A's targeted coupon. Otherwise, she will
buy from firm A. Whether or not firm A wants to target a coupon to this consumer depends upon
"Catalina Marketing, Citicorp P.O.S. Information Services, and Advanced Promotion Technologies have been
working with retailers on developing electronic couponing, whereby manufacturers' coupons can be targeted to con-
sumers at the point of sale based on their past purchasing behavior. The long range goal of these firms is to jump from
the testing stage of gathering data to the implementation of widescale target couponing programs. With the advent
of electronic couponing, increasingly complex targeting strategies will become feasible as the technology improves
and information on household purchasing behavior accumulates.
I II III IV V
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firm B's coupon targeting strategy and vice versa. For instance, firm A will not want to target its
coupon to this consumer if firm B does not target its coupon to her, since all C-Users in region II
who do not receive B's coupon will buy from A even without A's coupon. But if firm A does not
target its coupon to her, firm B will want to target her, so as to induce her to switch brands. Given
that each firm's targeting strategy is chosen simultaneously, it is clear from the above discussion
that no stage-two pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists for C-Users in region II. There does exist,
however, a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
To simplify the exposition, we henceforth restrict the admissable range of each firm's net tar-
geted coupon face value such that d; > 0; otherwise, C-Users will not redeem them. Furthermore,
for all d; > 0, we assume d; < RA - c - z to ensure that firm i would rather target its coupon
and make a sale than not target and not make a sale. This upper bound on d; is without loss of
generality, since firm i can still signal its intention not to target coupons in stage two (if it wishes)
by choosing d = 0 in stage one.
Define C,"(X) as firm i's pure strategy "target coupons to C-Users at X E [XA,X]" and let
C;'(X) denote firm i's pure strategy "do not target coupons to C-Users at X E [XA,X]." Then
the normal form game between firms A and B for C-Users in region II is given in figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Coupon Targeting in Region II
CB/ Of
Cft (PA-dA-c-z), -z (PA-dA-c-z), 01
Of 0, (PB-ds-c-z) (PA-c), 0
The first payoff in each cell corresponds to firm A's payoff and the second corresponds to firm
B's payoff. For instance, consider the upper-left cell in figure 2. This corresponds to a situation
in which both firms target their coupons in region II. In this case, all C-Users will buy brand A.
Thus, firm A's per-unit profit in this cell is equal to (PA - dA - c - z). Firm B's per-unit profit
loss in this cell is equal to its marginal cost of coupon targeting. In the lower-right cell in figure
2, neither firm targets coupons in region II. Once again, all C-Users will buy brand A. Firm A's
per-unit profit in this cell is equal to (PA - c). Firm B's per-unit profit in this cell is zero. In the
off-diagonal cells in figure 2, only the firm that targets in region II earns positive profit. Solving
for the unique mixed strategy equilibrium profile (see appendix A) yields (oA, oh), where
II PB - dB -c- z . I) dA+z
PB- dB-C PA -C
are the respective probabilities that firms A and B target coupons in region 11.15
Firm A prefers not to target coupons to C-Users in this region, since they are already predis-
posed to buy from A. Nonetheless, it practices defensive couponing because otherwise firm B would
target coupons to them with probability one. Firm B is aggressive in this region. At a marginal
cost z for every coupon delivered, it takes a chance on being able to attract new customers. On
balance, however, firm B succeeds in attracting brand switchers only with probability o,(1 - a),
since its offensive couponing is tempered somewhat by firm A's defensive couponing strategy.
Intuitively, the probability that firm A targets coupons to C-Users in region II is positively
related to firm B's net per unit markup, since the higher is firm B's markup, the more tempting it
is for firm B to target coupons, and hence the more defensive couponing firm A must do to retain
its customers. The probability that firm B targets coupons in this region is positively related both
to the marginal cost of couponing and to firm A's targeted coupon face value. The more firm A's
cost of defending its customers increases, the more tempting it is for firm A to forego targeting,
and hence the more attractive is firm B's offensive couponing. Notice it is possible for C-Users in
"There are two distinct ways to interpret each firm's mixed strategy. One can think of firm i's mixing in region II as
an all or nothing coupon drop that occurs with probability o,(C 1) or does not occur with probability (1 - o;(C; I)).
Alternatively, one can think of firm i as randomly selecting a fraction ar(C') of C- Users in region II to target. Under
the former interpretation, couponing emerges endogenously as an occasional price reduction phenomena. Under the
latter interpretation, coupons are continuously available to a fraction of consumers.
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this region to have zero, one, or two targeted coupons. An immediate implication when C-Users
have both is that the redemption rate for targeted coupons is necessarily less than one.
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Region IV is symmetric to region II. C-Users in this region will buy from firm A if they receive
A's targeted coupon and do not receive B's targeted coupon. Otherwise, they will buy from firm
B. Whether or not firm B targets coupons in this region depends on firm A's coupon targeting
strategy and vice versa. Just as in region II, it is easy to verify that there is no stage-two pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in this region. Solving for the unique mixed strategy equilibrium profile
yields (QA,&B), where
-C vy d 8 +z .C Vgy PA -dA-C-z
°A(C v) = dP +-zc, o(Ca ) =PA - dA - c 'eT~,PB - c PA-dA-c
are the respective probabilities that firms A and B target coupons in region IV. Analogous to region
II, firm B would prefer not to target coupons to C-Users in this region. Nonetheless, it does so to
mitigate the effectiveness of firm A's offensive couponing. On balance, firm A succeeds in attracting
brand switchers only with probability &A(1 - dB).
It is easy to verify that firm A (B) always (never) targets coupons to C-Users in region III.
Intuitively, these consumers will buy from firm A if and only if they have A's targeted coupon;
hence, it is not surprising that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in this region.
To summarize, each firm's equilibrium coupon targeting strategy for a given region r in brand
space is as follows:
'Given the static nature of the model, only one coupon can be redeemed per consumer even in the event a consumer
receives two. One might ask how the analysis would change in a dynamic model if, instead of throwing the second
coupon away, a consumer were to retain it until her next purchase occasion. Assuming the second coupon will not
have reached its expiration date, such a consumer would then prefer buying from the other firm, say firm B, in the
next period, all else being equal. However, knowing that its potential brand switchers already have B's targeted
coupon for use the next period, firm A will no longer be indifferent to sending these consumers a coupon for its
brand. The net result is that firm A will target coupons to consumers in this region with probability one and they
will once again buy brand A on their next purchase occasion. The original targeted coupon for brand B is saved
and the cycle is repeated for as long as firm B's coupon is valid. A symmetric argument applies to C- Users in region
IV. Given that firms A and B in the static model are indifferent to sending coupons to C-Users in regions II and
IV (property of the mixed strategy equilibrium), firm A's (B's) expected profit in equilibrium from each C- User in
region II (IV) is the same as if it sent coupons to them with probability one. Hence, it is straightforward to show
that modifying the game to allow for multiple periods, while altering coupon targeting strategies for period 2 onward
such that firm A (B) targets with probability one (sero) in region II and firm B (A) targets with probability one
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We conclude the analysis in this section by summing each firm's expected profit over all C-Users
given 11A and SIB. While this may seem an arduous task because of the induced brand switching
in regions II and IV, the summation is simplified by noting that in any mixed strategy equilibrium,
each player is indifferent between mixing or playing one of its pure strategies. In our model, this
means that firm A's expected profit in equilibrium from each C- User in region II is equal to the
profit it would receive from playing CI', i.e. (PA - dA - c - z), and firm B's expected profit in
equilibrium from each C-User in region II is equal to the profit it would receive from playing CB',
i.e. zero. Similarly, firm B's expected profit from each C-User in region IV is (PB - dB - c - z),
while firm A's expected profit from each C-User in region IV is zero.
Firm B's profit from each C-User in regions I and III is zero, while firm A's profit from each
C-User in regions I and III is (PA - c) and (PA - dA - c - z) respectively. Firm B earns (PB - c)
from each C-User in region V, while firm A's profit in this region is zero. Assuming a uniform
distribution of consumers over [0,11,17 and summing expected profits over all consumers yields
HA = (1 - a*)(RA - c)X + a' ((PA - c)Xs - (dA + z) (Xs - max{XA, 0))),
III =(1 - ac)(RB - c)(1 - X)+ a"((PB - c)(1 - Xs) - (dB + z)(min{XB,1) - Xs)).
Firm A's overall profit is equal to its profit from Non-Users plus its profit from C-Users in regions
I, II, and III. Similarly, firm B's overall profit is equal to its profit from Non-Users plus its profit
from C- Users in regions IV and V. Note that firm B's offensive couponing in region II yields no
gain, while firm A's expected profit in this region is somewhat dissipated relative to what it would
"This assumption allows us to derive explicit solutions for subsequent comparative static analysis. We discuss in
appendix D the sense in which our main propositions are robust to non-uniform customer distributions.
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be in the absence of B's targeting threat. Similarly, firm A's offensive couponing in region IV
yields no gain, while firm B's expected profit in this region is somewhat dissipated. Thus, whether
coupon targeting is profitable in equilibrium turns on whether firms can raise prices to Non-Users
and to C-Users in regions I and V by more than enough to offset the expected loss in profit from
the discounts given to C-Users in regions II, III, and IV.
IV Prices, Coupon Face Values, and Profit
We address several issues in this section: (a) do rival firms stand to gain or lose from the increasing
sophistication of coupon targeting programs, (b) how does the ability to target coupons to individual
households affect regular prices and coupon face values, and (c) what is the relationship between
coupon targeting programs and traditional mass-media distribution. In the process, we hope to
shed light on two polar views regarding the effects of couponing in a competitive environment.
One view is that coupons effectively sort consumers into groups with differing elasticities of
demand. Relative to a uniform price, firms raise price to the non-coupon users and, by way of
the discount, lower price to the coupon users. Intuition from the literature on oligopolistic third-
degree price discrimination, e.g. Borenstein (1985) and Holmes (1988), suggests this type of market
segmentation will be profitable even if market demand does not increase.'
8
An opposing view is that the outcome of couponing in a competitive environment is a prisoner's
dilemma in which all firms lose. According to this view, each firm's couponing succeeds only in
maintaining market share and, as a result, profits for each firm fall by an amount equal to the
cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers. This view rejects the traditional price
discrimination motive for coupons by implicitly assuming firms do not recover the cost of their
couponing activities with higher regular prices.'
9
1iBorenstein (1985) considers a spatial model in which consumers are located on a circle. Sorting consumers into
binary groups by reservation prices, he finds that for any given number of firms, third-degree price discrimination
always leads to higher profits. Holmes (1989) considers a symmetric duopoly model with general demand. In his
model, consumers are exogenously partitioned into two groups, which he calls the weak and strong markets. He also
finds that profits always rise with third-degree price discrimination when market demand is held constant."'In their survey chapter on coupons, Blattberg and Neslin (1990:271,272) summarize this view as follows: "The
Our analysis proceeds by examining these views in the context of two scenarios. In the first
(second) scenario, we consider the competitive effects of coupon targeting in the absence (presence)
of mass-media distribution. In doing so, we isolate the effects of targeted couponing after controlling
for the standard consumer self-selection story with mass-media distributed coupons.
Assume initially that the cost of distributing coupons via the mass-media is prohibitive and
focus exclusively on market segmentation induced by targeted couponing. In this case, Pi = Ri,
and d; is interpreted as firm i's targeted coupon face value. Proceeding back to the first stage,
each firm chooses its regular price and targeted coupon face value to maximize its second stage
equilibrium profit. Thus, firm i's problem is to choose (R;, Pi, d;) to maximize II; such that P, = R;
and d, > 0. Assuming tc > t"/2 and simultaneously solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of both
maximization problems yields the unique subgame perfect equilibrium regular prices and targeted
coupon face values as functions of the exogenous parameters z and t.20 The solution, given in figure
3 below, is derived in appendix B. We simplify notation by defining t' = tltc/((1 - c)tc + actn)
and interpreting it as a weighted average of the transportation costs of C- Users and Non- Users. It
is easily verified that t* < tw <t".
Figure 3: Targeted couponing in the absence of mass-media distribution.
Cost Ratio Regular Price Promotion Decisions Profit
z/t"* RA=RE PA=PB d = ddB IJ=II
g > 1 t"w+c t'+c 0 2
S< 1 tw+ c tw+c t- gw -*ct(azh_)T 2 t"
Discussion of the intuition and implications of figure 3 is best left until after the solution is
strategic problem faced by the manufacturer is that its market share is vulnerable to the couponing activities of its
competition. However, this view is shared by both manufacturers, so both end up using coupons and succeed in
protecting their market share, but have eroded their profits by incurring the costs of couponing."
aoThe restriction on C-User transportation costs ensures that regions I and V are non-empty. For t' < t"/2, one
can show the existence of equilibria in which all C-Users are potential brand switchers. Coupon targeting in this case
merely mimics mass-media couponing with little additional insight.
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given to the second scenario (figure 4). This will enable us to economize on the exposition as many
of the insights are robust across the two situations.
We now proceed to consider the polar case in which distributing coupons via the mass-media
is costless. In this case, P is interpreted as firm i's regular price minus the face value of its mass-
media coupon, and d; is interpreted as the amount by which firm i's targeted coupon face value
exceeds firm i's mass-media coupon face value. Each firm's problem in stage one is now modified
by replacing the constraint P, = R; with R; > P;. Thus, firm i's problem is to choose (R1, P;, d,)
to maximize I; such that R, > P, and d; > 0. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium, given in
figure 4 below, is derived in appendix C.
Figure 4: Targeted couponing in the presence of mass-media distribution.
4, the price-cost markup to these consumers in the absence of targeting is PA - c = t and the no
targeting condition is z > t*. Several marketing implications can now be deduced by interpreting
the transportation cost parameter as a measure of average consumer brand loyalty.
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Proposition 1 For a given z, coupon targeting emerges in equilibrium if and only if firms compete
in markets where average consumer brand loyalty exceeds a critical level.
An immediate implication is that firms in markets where consumer brand loyalty is relatively
weak, i.e. low product differentiation, will not target coupons. Firms in these markets (e.g. t'* < z
in figure 3) compete on price alone because per-unit price-cost markups are too small for coupon
targeting to be profitable. By analogous reasoning, firms in markets where competing brands are
highly differentiated target coupons because although it is expensive to induce consumers to switch
brands, per-unit price-cost markups are very large.s
Turning to the second column in figures 3 and 4, titled Regular Price, and comparing rows 1
and 2, it is seen that firms do not raise regular prices to Non-Users even when they can target
coupons to potential brand switchers. Moreover, in the first column under the heading Promotion
Decisions in figure 4, it is seen that the discounted prices paid by C-Users who do not have a
targeted coupon are also unaffected.
Proposition 2 Regular prices and mass-media coupon face values are unchanged after the intro-
duction of coupon targeting.
In equilibrium, some of the targeting is designed to keep one's own potential brand switchers
(defensive) and some of the targeting is designed to steal the rival's potential brand switchers
(offensive). As a result, the division of the market becomes blurred. Each firm lures away a
fraction of the rival's brand switchers with the net effect being to increase the area of competition
2 2
One can also think of the transportation cost parameter as a measure of product differentiation in the market
since at t = 0 the products are perfect substitutes and as t increases the products become less substitutable.23
Our proposition 1 contrasts with proposition I in Raju et al (1990), who find that firms do not price promote
when consumer brand loyalty is sufficiently large. In their model, price promotions cannot be targeted.
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Comparing equilibria in figures 3 and 4, we begin with the left-most column titled Cost Ratio.
This is the ratio formed by dividing the marginal cost of coupon targeting by the average trans-
portation cost of all users (C-Users) in figure 3 (4). In each figure, the first two rows delineate
the conditions under which coupon targeting will (d; > 0) or will not occur (d= = 0).21 Intuitively,
one would expect coupons not to be targeted if the marginal cost of coupon targeting exceeds the
price-cost markup on individual sales to C-Users, since inducing brand switching (or defending
market share) under such circumstances is never profitable. To verify this intuition, note that
the price-cost markup in figure 3 is RA - c = t' and that the no targeting condition is indeed
z > t'". Analogously, since mass-media coupons are assumed distributed to all C-Users in figure
21 Recall that regions II, III, and IV have zero width when dA = ds = 0.
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from a single point in the middle of brand space to the interval XB - XA. The enhanced competition
prevents firms from profitably charging higher prices to their more brand loyal customers.24
These findings do not contradict the usual coupon price discrimination story since comparing
across rows in figures 3 and 4 shows that the introduction of mass-media couponing does lead
to higher prices to the Non-Users. The reason is that random coupon distribution coupled with
consumer self-selection leads to an exogenous market segmentation which exploits differences in
coupon user/non-user price sensitivity. By contrast, the introduction of coupon targeting allows
firms to discriminate in price according to heterogeneity in consumer brand loyalty and, given the
play of (1 A, flB), leads to endogenous market segmentation. It is endogenous in the sense that the
number of C-Users in sections I and V is a function of both firms' regular prices and coupon face
values which are chosen in stage one. Thus, if a firm contemplates raising its regular price to these
consumers, it risks exposing a fraction of them to its rival's targeted coupon in stage two.25 In
equilibrium, coupon targeting has no effect on regular prices.
To summarize, both coupon targeting and mass-media coupon distribution can coexist. The
latter is associated with higher regular prices and is profitable for the firms; the former simply
increases competition for the potential brand switchers and is deleterious to firm profits.
Proposition 3 Coupon targeting in a competitive environment gives rise to a prisoner's dilemma
in which profits are lower for both firms.
Since coupon targeting is very effective in stealing a rival's potential brand switchers and keeping
one's own, each firm stands to gain by availing itself of the targeting technology regardless of its
2'
4
Formally, one can think of (RA, RB) as jointly determining X and (PA, PB) as jointly determining X. These
boundary points of marginal consumers separate firm A's customers from firm B's customers in the absence of targeted
coupon distribution. But they also serve the same role when coupons are targeted since, in equilibrium, dA = dB and
therefore Xs = X = X. Thus, the change in profit from a small change in price to those who do not redeem targeted
coupons is identical with or without targeted coupon distribution. In equilibrium, regular prices and mass-media
coupon face values are necessarily the same.
asThe endogeneity of market segmentation is critical in constraining firms from raising their regular prices when
coupons are targeted. In contrast, Narasimhan (1988), who considers a duopoly model in which consumers are either
captive brand loyal and not price-sensitive at all, or brand switchers and willing to shop around, finds that when firms
distribute coupons (redeemed only by brand switchers), prices rise to the non-coupon users (captive loyal customers).
Market segmentation is not endogenous in his setting, however, because the number of captive brand loyal customers
is assumed fixed.
rival's strategy. But firms are caught in a prisoner's dilemma. Although some consumers are
induced to switch brands, expected market shares do not change. And since regular prices do not
rise with the introduction of targeting, the net effect of this form of couponing in a competitive
environment is simply the cost of distribution plus the discount given to redeemers.
We now consider how coupon face values and the loss in profit with targeting vary with mass-
media distribution, average consumer brand loyalty, and the marginal cost of coupon targeting.
Turning to the fourth column in figures 3 and 4, titled Profit, and comparing rows 1 and 2, the
change in profit with the introduction of coupon targeting is given by
QC (z2 - (tk)2)
8t* <'
where k = w in the absence of mass-media distribution and k = c in the presence of mass-media
distribution. Since t' > t , the loss in profit from the introduction of coupon targeting is weakly
greater in the absence of mass-media distribution. The reason is that the additional discount given
to C- Users in regions II and IV when they already have a mass-media coupon, i.e. (te - z)/2 from
the second column under the heading Promotion Decisions in figure 4, is less than the targeted
discount they would receive if there were no mass-media coupon, i.e. (t" - z)/2 from figure 3.
Intuitively, the size of di endogenously determines the set of potential brand switchers. In
particular, d; determines the number of firm i's potential brand switchers. Although each firm tries
to steal its rival's customers, its expected profit from doing so is zero. Instead, firms earn positive
expected profit from their defensive targeting. From firm i's perspective, the marginal profit of a
customer who is prevented from switching to firm j is tk - z - dg. Since the interval of firm i's
potential brand switchers is d,/2t, firm i will choose di to maximize (tk - z - di)d;/2t. This yields
di = (tk - z)/2. Notice that di is proportional to the marginal profit from retaining a C-User,
which means it is increasing in average consumer brand loyalty. Not surprisingly, higher coupon
face values are needed to induce switching as the brands become more differentiated.
When coupons are not also distributed via the mass-media, di is interpreted as the actual
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targeted coupon face value. However, when coupons are in addition distributed via the mass-
media, the actual targeted coupon face value is given by R, - P + d; = t" - (tC+ z)/2. Comparing
actual targeted coupon face values across scenarios gives
t" - (t + z)> -(t° + z) (2t" - tc) - z > (t"'-z)
2 - 2 2 - 2 '
which implies that targeted coupon face values are weakly higher (strictly higher if t" > t*) in
the presence of mass-media coupon distribution than in its absence. This finding simply reflects
the fact that regular prices are higher when mass-media coupons are also distributed and hence
C-Users must be given a larger targeted discount.
One might think that a lower marginal cost of couponing targeting would benefit the firms.
This is not the case, however, since a lower cost of couponing induces higher equilibrium targeted
coupon face values, which in turn increases the width of regions II and IV thereby leading to an
increase in the number of coupons distributed. This chain of events also has adverse implications
regarding the redemption rate and number of incremental sales as will be seen in section VI.
V Offensive and Defensive Targeting
The allure of the new targeted forms of couponing is obvious; they can be used to attract rival
firms' potential brand switchers. The idea is that some consumers may be induced to purchase what
would otherwise be a less preferred brand for them simply because they have received that brand's
coupon. Since a firm stands to gain to the extent that its coupons can generate incremental sales
in this manner, it would seem that firms should target their coupons offensively. Indeed, this is the
advice routinely offered in the literature. For instance, Alsop (1985) recommends that coupons be
mailed directly to competitive brand users, Blattberg and Neslin (1990) note that manufacturers
can place their coupons in magazines more likely to be read by a rival's customers, and Rossi and
Allenby (1993) suggest that firms may want to target coupons to households "that show loyalty
toward other brands and yet are price sensitive."
These prescriptions are not convincing in a competitive context, however, as coupon targeting
can also serve to defend market share by preventing a rival firm's coupon promotion from luring
away one's own potential brand switchers. Thus, it may seem surprising that our analysis strongly
concurs with the offensive minded intuition, provided the cost of coupon targeting is relatively high
(as is presently the case). On the other hand, our analysis further suggests that as the marginal cost
of coupon targeting falls over time, firms should gradually decrease their efforts to attract brand
switchers and instead shift more towards defending against the loss of their existing customers.
To see this, substitute equilibrium (PA, PB) and (dA, dB) when z < 1k into (f1A, AlB). This gives
the probability that a firm targets offensively as
oB =tka(C ) = &A(CAv _2th
and the probability that a firm targets defensively as
k+z
To reduce the dimensionality of these targeting incidences, let the marginal cost of coupon targeting
be expressed as a fraction of the transportation cost, i.e. z = ftk, where 0 < f < 1. The incidence
of offensive and defensive targeting can now be depicted in figure 5 below with f on the horizontal
axis and the probability of targeting on the vertical axis.
Proposition 4 Firms should predominantly target offensively when the cost of coupon targeting is
high and adjust their mix by implementing relatively more defensive targeting as this cost falls.
As the cost of coupon targeting decreases, stealing a rival's customers and defending one's own
customers becomes more attractive. If its rival were to continue to practice the same (or less)
incidence of defensive targeting, a firm would target offensively with certainty. Knowing this, firms
implement relatively more defensive targeting to defend their market share. In equilibrium, the
amount of offensive targeting actually decreases given the intensity of defensive couponing. Exactly
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the same intuition applies when average consumer brand loyalty increases, since stealing a rival's
customers and defending one's own becomes more attractive the higher are equilibrium regular
prices. The managerial prescription is summarized below.
Proposition 5 Firms should implement relatively more defensive targeting the higher is average
consumer brand loyalty in their industry.
VI Comparative Statics
In their survey chapter on coupons, Blattberg and Neslin (1990) provide a very useful framework
to assess the profitability of a firm's coupon promotion taking as given coupon face values and
prices as well as the rival's coupon distribution strategy. Their method weighs the incremental
gains engendered by a firm's coupon promotion against its associated incremental costs. In addi-
tion to the number of coupons distributed, two other variables of interest stand out. One is the
coupon redemption rate. The other is incremental sales per redemption, defined as the fraction of
redemptions that are from customers who would not have bought the firm's product had they not
received its coupon. In this section, we derive comparative statics concerning how these important
variables change across markets with differing degrees of average consumer brand loyalty and over
time as the marginal cost of coupon targeting falls.
Number of Targeted Coupons Distributed
The number of targeted coupons distributed by each firm depends on the width of regions II and
IV and on the incidence of offensive and defensive targeting. It is given by
N= [(X- XA)Ca+ (XB -XS)&A=(tk - z)(3(tk)2 + z
2)
8 (tk)2(tk + z)
It is easily verified that N is decreasing in z and increasing in tk. Intuitively, the greater is the
marginal cost of coupon targeting relative to average consumer brand loyalty, the smaller is the net
gain from inducing a rival firm's C-User to switch brands. Hence, firms simply have less incentive
to target coupons when z is high and when tk is low.
Targeted Coupon Redemption Rate
Since defensively targeted coupons are always redeemed and offensively targeted coupons are re-
deemed only if a C-User does not also have a defensive coupon, the number of targeted coupons
redeemed per firm is equal to the incidence of each firm's defensive targeting times the number of its
potential brand switchers plus the incidence of each firm's offensive targeting times the probability
that its rival does not target defensively times the number of its rival's potential brand switchers
Thus, each firm's targeted coupon redemption rate is given by
R - [(Xs - XA)U* + (XB - XA)&A(1 - &B)] - 2((tk) 2 + z2 )
N - 3 (tk)2+ z2
Each firm's targeted coupon redemption rate is increasing in z and decreasing in tk. Intuitively, since
C-Users are presumed to incur no cost of coupon usage, the only reason why each firm's targeted
coupon redemption rate would be less than one is if some C-Users receive targeted coupons from
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both firms. This occurs more frequently the greater is the overlap between offensive and defensive
targeting. Referring to figure 5, the overlap is seen to be higher with low z (high tk). Hence, targeted
coupon redemption rates increase with the marginal cost of coupon targeting and decrease with
average consumer brand loyalty.
Targeted Incremental Sales per Redemption
Each firm's targeted incremental sales, defined as the decrease in sales that would occur if the firm
defected from equilibrium by not targeting coupons, is equal to the number of consumers who have
received both targeted coupons plus the number of offensively targeted coupons that are redeemed.
Thus, each firm's targeted incremental sales per redemption is given by
I [(Xs - XA)GaAG + (XB - Xs)&A(1 - B)] - (tk + z)
2
R 2((tk)2 + z2)
Each firm's targeted incremental sales per redemption rate is increasing in z and decreasing in tk.
Intuitively, the only reason why sales from targeted coupon redeemers would not be incremental
is if some of a firm's potential brand switchers received only its targeted coupon. Since these
consumers would have bought from it even in the absence of its coupon, they cannot be considered
incremental. These non-incremental redemptions are more likely to occur the lower is the incidence
of the rival firm's offensive targeting. Referring to figure 5, the incidence of a firm's offensive
targeting is lower for low z (high tk). Hence, targeted incremental sales per redemption increase
with the marginal cost of coupon targeting and decrease with average consumer brand loyalty. This
comparative static result and the preceding ones are summarized in figure 6 below. In the figure,
pluses (minuses) signify a positive (negative) relationship.
Proposition 6 Firms will distribute more targeted coupons, choose higher targeted coupon face
values, experience lower targeted coupon redemption rates and achieve lower incremental sales per
redemption the higher is average consumer brand loyalty in their industry.
Figure 6: Summary of comparative statics results
Brand loyalty
Cost of couponing
Face Value Number Distributed Redemption Rate Incremental Sales
+ + - -
+ +
One might think that the incidence of targeting should be decreasing in average consumer
brand loyalty, since inducing additional consumers to switch brands would become increasingly
more expensive. Yet this factor is more than offset by the increasingly attractive per-unit price-
cost markup; although the size of the discount needed to induce consumers to switch is increasing
in average consumer brand loyalty, the regular prices that firms charge are increasing even more.
As the incidence of targeting increases, however, consumers with multiple targeted coupons become
more frequent and hence redemption rates fall. Incremental sales per redemption also fall as firms
shift more toward defending their market share.
A similar pattern holds as the cost of coupon targeting falls. Firms adjust on the margin by
increasing their coupon face value, though by less than the decrease in z, and taking advantage
of the decrease in the cost of attracting brand switchers by increasing their incidence of targeting.
Redemption rates and incremental sales per redemption fall for the same reason as above.
Proposition 7 Targeted coupon face values will increase, more targeted coupons will be distributed,
targeted coupon redemption rates will decrease, and fewer redemptions will be incremental over time
as the cost of coupon targeting falls.
Propositions 6 and 7 predict a negative association between targeted coupon face values and
targeted coupon redemption rates, and between targeted coupon face values and targeted incre-
mental sales per redemption, over time and across industries with varying consumer brand loyalty.
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At first blush, these predictions appear to be at odds with some established empirical literature
which suggests the opposite is true. Based on observations from actual coupon drops, Reibstein
and Traver (1982) and Ward and Davis (1978) find that higher coupon face values are associated
with higher coupon redemption rates. Similarly, Klein (1985) and Shoemaker and Tibrewala (1985)
find a positive relationship between coupon face values and incremental sales. In fact, these stud-
ies are demonstrating a functional relationship between two variables while holding other factors
constant, whereas our predictions are based on equilibrium comparisons in which all factors vary
simultaneously. To illustrate the difference in methods, and why there need be no contradiction,
our predictions are fully consistent with the trend during the 1980's in which coupon face values
increased in excess of the inflation rate while average coupon redemption rates uniformly declined.
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VII Conclusion
Our primary objective in this article has been to provide an analytical framework to investigate the
competitive implications of the new forms of coupon targeting in which promotion discounts can
be directed at brand switchers. In the process, we have compared and contrasted rivalry in price
discrimination which leads to exogenous market segmentation, such as random coupon distribution
coupled with consumer self-selection, with rivalry in price discrimination which leads to endogenous
market segmentation, such as the new forms of coupon targeting. Our main result, after controlling
for mass-media distribution, is that when coupons can be directed at brand switchers, the outcome
is a prisoner's dilemma in which firms necessarily lose profit because regular prices do not increase.
We also derive managerial implications concerning the optimal mix of offensive and defensive
targeting as well as several testable implications concerning the effects of coupon targeting on mass-
media and targeted coupon face values, coupon redemption rates, incremental sales per redemption,
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A similar apparent paradox and resolution apply to the relationship between redemption rates and incremental
sales. Intuition suggests a negative functional relationship between R and I, since pure defensive targeting would
achieve a 100% redemption rate but garner relatively few incremental sales, and a pure offensive targeting strategy
would achieve a 100% incremental sales per redemption but have a low redemption rate. However, this intuition holds
only if all other factors (coupon face values, number of coupons distributed, etc.) are held constant. Comparing across
equilibria, as in propositions 6 and 7, yields different insights.
and the overall number of coupons distributed. Unfortunately, the interpretation of past and
presently available data is somewhat problematic because targeted and mass-media coupons have
typically been mixed in the aggregate reported statistics and because the new forms of coupon
targeting are so recent. Nevertheless, the decision by A.C. Neilson to track in-store coupons as a
separate category for the first time in 1994 holds promise for future testing. For now, it is of some
assurance to note that the number of coupons distributed during the 1980's increased dramatically,
and that casual observation suggests current targeting strategies are primarily designed to induce
brand switching. Both of these observations are consistent with the model's predictions.
Our framework consists of a relatively simple, stylized two-parameter model. Nevertheless, our
main insights are robust to several modeling extensions as has been discussed previously. They
include allowing the firms to locate symmetrically at any pair of locations on [0,1], adding dy-
namics to enable consumers to use unredeemed coupons on future purchase occasions, modifying
the Hotelling linear demands by allowing for symmetric non-uniform customer distributions, and
altering the sequence of play to have regular prices chosen first, followed by coupon face values and
then targeting strategies.
Two extensions that we have not considered but which are nonetheless important are to allow for
asymmetric customer distributions and to weaken firms' information sets regarding their knowledge
of the approximate location of consumers in brand space. The first extension is necessary to
investigate the relationship between targeted coupon promotions and firm size, particularly as it
relates to market share. The second extension would help clarify the relationship between the two
polar types of market segmentation considered in this article and, in addition, increase the scope of
the analysis to include less accurate forms of targeting such as placing coupons in magazines more
likely to be read by rivals' customers.
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Appendix A
Let (GA(C~f), aB(Ca')) be a mixed-strategy equilibrium profile of the normal game given in figure
2, where aA(C A) and aB(CL) are the respective probabilities that firms A and B send coupons to
C-Users in region II. Since in any such equilibrium a firm's mixed strategy makes its rival indifferent
between its two pure strategies, (Ga(C.j), aB(CL')) necessarily satisfy the following equations:
BrA - a(RA- 2 dA - c - z)+AO
OdA - 21c
AAdA = 0, AA ? 0, dA -0,
84 (RA-2RB+c)+ -(dB- d)+ -=0,
ORB c22tc






- GA(CA)z+{1 - EA(CA)}(PB - dB - c - z)= 0, (1) 
ABdB =0, AB >0, dB >0.
(PA - dA - c - z) = {1 - CB(C'))(PA - c), (2)
where the left hand side of equation (1) (equation (2)) is firm B's (A's) expected payoff from tar-
geting coupons in region II and the right hand side of equation (1) (equation (2)) is firm B's (A's)
expected payoff from not targeting coupons in region II. The unique solution is given in the text.
Appendix B
In this appendix, we derive the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the absence of mass-media
coupons assuming tC > t"/2. Our derivation consists of four parts. In part 1, we characterize the
necessary conditions for existence of an equilibrium in which XA > 0 and XB < 1. In part 2, we
solve these necessary conditions and thereby identify a candidate equilibrium. In part 3, we show
that neither firm can profitably deviate and hence establish that the solution identified in part 2
is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium. In part 4, we demonstrate uniqueness by proving there
exists no other subgame perfect equilibrium.
Part 1: In the absence of mass-media coupons, firm i chooses R1, Pi, and d, by maximizing I; as
defined in section III such that Pi = R1, and di 2 0, taking its rival's choices as given. Substituting
Ri in for Pi, firm i's Lagrange function is given by £; = HI;+ Aid;. Any subgame perfect equilibrium
in which XA > 0 and XB < 1 can now be characterized by the following necessary first order
conditions derived from each firm's constrained optimization:
R = 2(R - 2RA + c)+ (dA - dB)+ = 0, (3)
It is easily verified that the second order conditions for constrained optimization are satisfied.
Part 2: Let (R;, ;, 4di, l) for i = A, B satisfy conditions (3) to (8). The solution is derived by
solving the following four Kuhn-Tucker cases:
Case 1: AA > 0 and AB > 0 (No Targeting): In this case, dA = dB = 0 and, as can be
verified, NA = NB = PA = PB = l* + c. The aA > 0 and aB > 0 imply t* < z.
Case 2: AA = aB = 0 (Targeting): Solving equations (3), (4), (6), and (7) by setting
AA = AB = 0, we have RA = RB = PA = PB = ' + c, and dA = dB = (t* - z)/2. Equations (5)
and (8) imply i* > z. Given t* > t"/2, XA > 0 and XB < 1 are indeed satisfied.
Case 3: AA > 0 and AB = 0: In this case, JA = 0. Solving equations (3), (6) and (7) gives:
- _- , ctw(z - t*)RA = PA=t+c +a 6Etc- act '
- - 6t*(t.' - z)
RB = PB=z +c ,
= 3t*(t - z)
~Etc - act" '
However, dB > 0 implies i" > z and AA > 0 implies, by equation (4), t' < z. A contradiction.
Case 4: AA = 0 and AB > 0: This case is symmetric to case 3.
Thus, if a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which XA > 0 and XB < 1, it is uniquely
defined by cases 1 and 2 for the given parameter values therein.
Part 3: We now establish that the solution identified above is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium.
This is accomplished by showing that neither firm can profitably deviate. In particular, it must be
that firm A (B) cannot profitably deviate such that XA < 0 (XB 2 1).
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For t* > z and given RB = tW+ c and dB = (tw - z)/2, firm A's optimal deviation such that
XA < 0 is given by:
(RA,dA) = arg max H(RA,dA, RB,dB) such that dA >0 and XA <0.
RA,dA^
It is straightforward to show that RA = (tw + 2t" + z)/2 + c, and dA = (tw + 2tc - z)/4, which
implies XA = 0. Relaxing the constraint to allow XA > 0 as in case 2 above yields strictly higher
profit. Hence, firm A's deviation is unprofitable. By symmetry, it is also never optimal for firm
B to deviate. Hence, the solution defined by case 2 is indeed a subgame perfect equilibrium for
t* > z. In the same way, it is straightforward to show that the solution given in case 1 defines a
subgame perfect equilibrium for t* < z.
Part 4: To establish uniqueness, we consider whether other subgame perfect equilibria exist. For
instance, can there be an asymmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in which XA 5 0 and XB 1?
If so, it is necessarily characterized by
(R'A,dA) = arg max IiA(RA,dA, R',d') such that dA 2 0 and XA 5 0,
(R', d') = arg max H (R', d', RB, dB) such that dB >0 and XB K1.
It is straightforward, albeit arduous, to show that, for t > t"/2, the unique solution requires XA = 0
and no other constraints bind. However, at the candidate equilibrium, firm A can profitably deviate
so that XA > 0. The case where XA 2 0 and XB > 1 is symmetric. Thus, it can be concluded
that no asymmetric subgame perfect equilibrium exists.
We can similarly show that no subgame perfect equilibrium exists where XA 0 and Xy 2 1.
Since the proof is analogous, we spare readers the details. This completes our proof that, for
t° > t"/2, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is defined in cases 1 and 2.
Appendix C
In this appendix, we derive the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the presence of mass-media
coupons. Our derivation consists of four parts. In part 1, we characterize the necessary conditions
for existence of an equilibrium in which XA > 0 and XB < 1. In part 2, we solve these necessary
conditions and thereby identify a candidate equilibrium. In part 3, we show that neither firm can
profitably deviate and hence establish that the solution identified in part 2 is indeed a subgame
perfect equilibrium. In part 4, we demonstrate uniqueness by proving there exists no other subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Part 1: In the presence of mass-media coupons, firm i chooses R;, P and d, to maximize I;
such that R; > P, and d; > 0, taking its rival's choices as given. We can simplify the analysis
considerably by observing that for t" > t*, the first constraint never binds for firm i. Incorporating
this observation, the Lagrange function is again given by G; = 1 + Aid,. Any subgame perfect
equilibrium in which XA > 0 and XB < 1 can now be characterized by the following necessary first
order conditions derived from each firm's constrained optimization:
-2Ri+R-i+"+c= 0, ()9)
-2P+P-i+ di - d-i +t*+c= 0,
a*(Pi-2di- c-z)+A




It is easily verified that the second order conditions for constrained optimization are satisfied.
Part 2: Let (R;, P, d,;A,) for i = A, B satisfy conditions (9) to (12). The solution is derived in
the same way as in appendix B and is given in figure 4.
Part 3: We now establish that the solution identified in figure 4 is indeed a subgame perfect
equilibrium. This is accomplished by showing that neither firm can profitably deviate. In particular,
it must be that firm A (B) cannot profitably deviate such that XA 0 (XB > 1). But this is
trivial to show. Suppose PA and dA is firm A's optimal deviation in the C-User market such that
XA < 0. Then it must be the case that dA = 0, for otherwise, if dA > 0, firm A could increase its
profit by reducing its discounted price by this amount and not targeting coupons. However, dA = 0
implies XA = Xs and therefore firm A's deviation profit from C-Users equals zero. Hence, it is not
profitable for firm A to deviate. A similar analysis shows that firm B will not deviate.
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Part 4: To establish uniqueness, one must show that no subgame perfect equilibria in which
XA < 0 or XB > 1 exists. This is straightforward and utilizes the same logic in part 3 that proved
there could be no profitable deviation by either firm.
Appendix D
In this appendix, we consider the robustness of the model to symmetric non-uniform customer
distributions. Unfortunately, general conclusions are hard to reach since it is impossible to solve
analytically for equilibrium R;, P;, and d,. Nonetheless, we are able to show that for any symmetric
non-uniform customer distribution, equilibrium firm profits necessarily decrease, and equilibrium
regular prices do not change, in the neighborhood of z for which coupon targeting just emerges
in equilibrium. This provides support for the proposition that competitive coupon targeting does
not allow firms profitably to raise price (proposition 2) and for the proposition that the outcome
of targeting is a prisoner's dilemma (proposition 3).
Let f(z) denote the distribution density function and .F(x) the corresponding cumulative dis-
tribution function. We assume that f(z) is continuous, differentiable, and symmetric over [0,1].
With these assumptions, it is trivial to verify that f'({) = 0 and 1(z) = I. For simplicity, we
consider only the case where mass-media couponing is absent and restrict attention to equilibria
for which XA > 0 and XB < 1. All other assumptions in the paper remain unchanged.
Since a firm's targeting strategy is unaffected by the distribution density of consumers (see
derivation in section III), the second stage equilibrium targeting strategies are given by (1A, Ql)
as in the text. What differs with non-uniform customer distribution is the summation of consumers
in each region, which yields non-linear demand functions for each firm. Thus, profits for the
respective firms are modified as follows:
HA = (1 - a)(RA - c)F(X) + a*{(RA - c)F(Xs) - (dA + z)(F(Xs) - F(XA))},
fIB = (1 - ac)(R8 - c)(1 - F(X))+ a*{(Rl - c)(1 - F(Xs)) - (dB + z)(F(Xl) - F(Xs))},
where the first (second) term in each profit function is the net profit from Non-Users (C- Users).
Assuming both firms target coupons, the subgame perfect equilibrium is then characterized by the
following first order conditions:
0Ha X + 8Xs - XX } +=' RA(Xs)+(RA - c)f(Xs)R - (dA+z)(f(Xs)Oy-f(XA)OXA +
(1- aC)F(X) + (1- ac)(RA - c)f(X)--- = 0,
ORA
8HIA ( 8Xs OXs _ XA
OdA = -ac(RA c)f Xs)- - (-F(Xs) - F(XA)) - (dA + z)(f(Xs)d- f(XA) ) +OdAdA 8A dA
(1 - ca)(RA - c)f(X) = 0,
= {a1 - F(Xs) - (RB - c)f(Xs)OX - (dB + z)(f(X l)i- f(Xs)-XS) +
OR O- RB ORB
(1- O*)(1 - F(X)) -(1- ac)(RB - c)f(X) =0,
= -aC (Ra - c)f(Xs)!xA + (F(XB) - F(Xs)) + (dl + z)(f(X) - f(Xs) 5 ) -
(1 - ac)(RB - c)f(X) -- = 0.
8dB
Let the symmetric solution be given by RA = RB = A, and dA = dB = d. This means that
Xs = X = 1/2, and XA = 1 - XB. Since the first order conditions for firms A and B are identical,
the above system of equations can be reduced to the following two identities:
2~~ *(N- c) - f(t d)-f(!) (j+ z) = 0,2 2 2tc 2t_ 2 J
2 (R d-c-)-2 .F~tt nO.
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Totally differentiating the above two identities with respect to z and evaluating the resulting two
identities at z such that the firms are just indifferent between targeting and not targeting (d = 0),
we have:
f(-1) dR =2()  -0
2t"'dz '
f(1)dR f( )dd f() =
2tc dz te dz 2tc ~
Solving yields dk/dz = 0 and dd/dz = -1/2. This means that equilibrium regular prices do not
change in the neighborhood of z for which coupon targeting just emerges in equilibrium.
To verify that coupon targeting leads to a prisoner's dilemma, substitute (RA, RB, dA, dB) into
'IA and fIB and differentiate with respect to z to give
dli, Oli dli OHi ddi Hi, dIL, OH, dd_,+ H,
dz 8R; dz Od; dz 8R_, dz Od-i dz Oz
Substituting in dR,/dz = dlL,/dz = 0 and dd,/dz = dL_,/dz = -1/2, and noting that
8H;/8d; = 0 by the envelope theorem, we have
dH A d1 8  cas( - c)f( ) >0
dz dz 4tc
This means that equilibrium firm profits necessarily decrease in the neighborhood of z for which
coupon targeting just emerges in equilibrium.
Appendix E
In this appendix, we show the robustness of our results to any pair of symmetric firm locations, a
and b, for which a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists with C-Users in all five regions.
27 Since
the proof for the case with mass-media couponing is analogous to the case without mass-media
couponing, we focus exclusively on the latter and leave details of the other to the reader.
27As is well known (see d'Aspremont et al., 1979), pure strategy Nash pricing equilibria do not exist if a and b are
sufficiently close. For example, in the standard Hotelling model with linear transport costs, a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium exists for symmetric firm locations if and only if a < 1/4. This is because there is a discontinuity in each
firm's demand that arises with linear transportation costs; if firm B (A) succeeds in obtaining the patronage of a
consumer located at a (b), it also necessarily captures all consumers located in the interval [0, a) ([i,11).
Note that whenever there are equilibria with C- Users in all five regions, the definitions of XA,
XB, and Xs are unaffected by the fact that the two firms are now located away from the two ends.
Since XA > a and XB < & in any such equilibria, firms' targeting strategies and payoff functions
also remain unchanged. Therefore, the necessary conditions characterizing such an equilibrium are
the same as if the two firms located at both ends and, consequently, so is the candidate equilibrium.
Now, we need only to show that such an equilibrium indeed exists, given that the two firms are
located symmetrically away from the two ends.
Consider, without loss of generality, firm A's possible deviations. Given AB = i* + c and
da = (tW - z)/2, firm A can either deviate by choosing (RA,dA) such that it has no C-Users in
region I or it can deviate by choosing (RA, dA) such that it captures all of firm B's C- Users. In the
former case, the optimal deviation for firm A is given by:
(NA,dA) = arg max(1 - csc)(RA - c)X + c(RA - dA - c - z)Xs
s.t. XA < a and dA > 0.
In the latter case, it is given by:
(NA, dA) = arg max (1 - a')(RA - c)X + a" {(RA - c)XA + (RA - dA - c - z)(1 - XA)}
RIA,A
s.t. XS=b and dA>0.
Straightforward calculations show it is never profitable for firm A to take the first path. In the
latter case, the profitability of firm A's deviation is decreasing in b. At 6 = 2, it can be shown
that firm A cannot profitably deviate. Since firm B's deviation is symmetric, we conclude that, for
& > 9 and a < 4, the subgame perfect equilibrium exists as stated in figure 3 in the text.
2s
2eThe exact cutoff points at which a and & make firms A and B just indifferent to deviating are implicitly defined
by a complex expression of several parameters.
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